As the world prepares for Trump's next term, striking new polling results have revealed a split in opinion about the new president.

An opinion survey conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations in developed and developing countries showed that pessimism about Trump’s impact on world peace and the respondents' own countries was highest among U.S. allies in Europe and Northeast Asia. In contrast, responses from influential developing countries like Turkey and Indonesia were much more optimistic.

Part of this sentiment seems to be based on the assumption among Global South elites that Trump could be open to doing business. This optimism is also reflected among African leaders, who seem to calculate that Trump's return brings some opportunities despite his disdain for the continent.

Washington's disinterest in Africa

One reason for this trend is hinted at in the polling data. The European pessimism about his return is partly a recognition that Trump doesn’t place the same central importance on the Atlantic relationship as former President Joe Biden and his Secretary of State Antony Blinken did. Furthermore, it complicates the EU-US resistance to Russia.

This implies an erosion of the EU's structural privilege and normative power at a time when three pillars that maintained its global centrality – cheap gas from Russia, economic security provided by the US, and economic manufacturing in China for high-end European brands – all seem to be becoming increasingly fragile.

More leeway for Africa

The weakening of Europe and its distance from Washington complicate the establishment of coherent norms that previously served as a tool for Euro-American power projection, potentially giving more leeway to African countries.

The likelihood that Washington’s general disinterest in Africa will continue from Biden to Trump paradoxically reinforces this trend. When we were there in July, officials made it clear that, with or without Lobito, Africa ranks lower than either Oceania or Antarctica on the DC radar. Few things make U.S. officials focus on the continent except China’s presence there, and even that might not be enough.

This is because the incoming Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, is already focusing on China in Latin America, an approach that aligns with his concerns and the battles Trump wants to engage in, including those related to migration and fentanyl. These issues allow Trump to target both China and Mexico simultaneously, which resonates with his MAGA base.

Partnership options for Africa

In contrast, the rumored appointment of J. Peter Pham as Trump’s Assistant Secretary of State for Africa seems to imply that much of the U.S.-Africa engagement will occur through business and lobbying ties. A more mercantilist U.S.-Africa relationship could allow African leaders to continue working discreetly with occasionally controversial actors like the United Arab Emirates or even Russia.

It remains to be seen if this will also apply to China. During Trump's first term, pressure on key players in the China-Africa relationship, like Huawei, significantly increased, but it is unclear if this will continue.

The future of the Lobito Corridor

The fate of the Lobito Corridor will be an indicator in this regard. If Trump decides to keep the project to contain China's influence or if he prefers to dismantle it as part of a "destroy the legacy of his predecessor" strategy, it will partly depend on pressure from U.S. companies on critical minerals. Whether they prefer investing in refining African minerals in the U.S. or lobbying to continue buying them already refined from China will reveal much about the economic underpinnings of current geopolitics.

It will also provide signals to Africa about its own development partnership options as it struggles to keep up with its population growth. My prediction is that, despite the optimism about Trump's ability to strike deals, these options will increasingly shift eastward, along the Indian Ocean, all the way to China.

Article source: theafricareport